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Evidence of Producer's Due Care in a
Products Liability Action
Robert A. Bernstein*
I.

INTRODUCTION

In a products liability case, evidence of defendant's due care in the
manufacturing or processing operation can be a potent and sometimes
critical factor in the decision of a judge or jury.' The question remains,
however, whether such evidence is properly admissible under contemporary versions of the implied warranty and strict liability theories that
have fashioned the recent revolution in consumer product law.2 The
leading chronicler of the revolution, Dean Prosser, has noted the practical importance of the issue and has concluded, apparently without
reservation, that in the ordinary case evidence of the defendant's due
care is immaterial.4 The reasoning is superficially compelling: since
strict liability eliminates any question of negligence, it simply is not
relevant whether the defendant did or did not exercise due care.5 This
conclusion is supported by a leading Washington decision, Pulley v.
7
Pacific Coca-Cola Bottling Co.,' and several other cases.
*

Associate Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University. B.S. 1952, M.A. 1956, Stan-

ford University, J.D. 1962, American University.
I. See. e.g., Tozer. Preparationand Use of Technical Evidence in Products Liability Cases,
16 DEFENSE L.J. 669, 670-72 (1967). See also note 3 infra.
2. By definition, when liability is predicated on conventional negligence grounds there is no
question regarding the competence of evidence of the defendant's due care.
3. "[S]o long as the defendant can introduce evidence of his own due care, the possibility
remains that it may influence the size of the verdict, as jurymen impressed with it stubbornly hold
out for no liability, or a smaller sum." Prosser, The Assault on the Citadel, 69 YALE L.J. 1099
(1960). In the latest edition of his Law of Torts, however, Prosser appears to downplay the role of
due care evidence. he notes that by and large, once the proof;reaches the point at which a jury is
permitted to find for the plaintiff, the jury ordinarily will in fact do so. W. PROSSER, TORTS § 103
at 672 (4th ed. 1971).
4. W. PROSSER, supra note 3, § 103 at 672.
5. "Strict liability has eliminated any question of negligence, and in the ordinary case has
made evidence of the defendant's due care immaterial." Id.
6. 68 Wash. 2d 778, 415 P.2d 636 (1966).
7. Hessler v. Hillwood Mfg. Co., 302 F.2d 61 (6th Cir. 1962): Simmons v. Wichita CocaCola Bottling Co., 181 Kan. 35, 309 P.2d 633 (1957); Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Lyons, 145
Miss. 876, 11I So. 305 (1927). See also Russell v. Community Blood Bank, 185 So. 2d 749 (Fla.
Ct. App. 1966), affd, 196 So. 2d 115 (Fla. 1967) (stating in dictum that "a showing of due care
on the manufacturer's part is not a defense to a breach of implied warranty"); Snead v. Waite,
306 Ky. 587, 208 S.W.2d 749 (1948) (affirming the trial court's refusal to instruct that defendants
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Analysis indicates, however, that the question is not so simple, and

that evidence of due care probably should be admitted under many
circumstances.
Preliminarily, it should be noted that Prosser and Pulley do not
stand uncontradicted by other authority. Some earlier cases, based on
the law of implied warranty and decided prior to the full development

of the theory of strict liability in tort, favor admissibility.8 And a comment to the Uniform Commercial Code states unequivocally that evidence of due care in the manufacture, processing or selection of goods
"is relevant to the issue-of whether the warranty was in fact broken"-whether the product at the time of delivery by the defendant was
in fact defective
One might glean from these divergent authorities that admissibility
of due care evidence will turn on the theory of recovery-that it is
admissible when the action is based on breach of implied warranty but

inadmissible when based on strict liability in tort. This conclusion, however, is unwarranted, since the strict liability and warranty theories
probably are identical in substance, differing principally in the degree
to which the strict liability theory ignores such traditional Code limitations as privity of contract, disclaimers, and notice requirements. 0 Indeed, many cases tried on the warranty theory have disregarded the
Code comment and opted for the Prosserian view of irrelevancy."
would not be liable if they had exercised reasonable care in preparation of the offending food,
because "the exercise of reasonable care is not a defense to a suit for breach of warranty"). These
cited cases were tried on a warranty theory, as was Pulley. The evidentiary considerations should
be the same in warranty as in strict tort liability actions. See note 10 infra and accompanying text.
8. Nichols v. Continental Baking Co., 34 F.2d 141 (3d Cir. 1929); Barefield v. LaSalle CocaCola Bottling Co., 370 Mich. 1, 120 N.W.2d 786 (1963); Swenson v. Purity Baking Co., 183 Minn.
289, 236 N.W. 310 (1931); Smith v. Salem Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 92 N.H. 97, 25 A.2d 125
(1942); Simon v. Graham Bakery, 17 N.J. 525, 111 A.2d 884 (1955); Conklin v. Ossining Food
Center, Inc., 48 N.Y.S.2d 716 (Westchester County Ct. 1944); cf Grudt v. City of Los Angeles, 2
Cal. 3d 575, 468 P.2d 825, 86 Cal. Rptr. 465 (1970).
9. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-314, Comment 13.
10. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment m at 355 (1964). This comment
sets forth the strict tort liability rule and notes that "[tihere is nothing in this Section which would
prevent any court from treating the rule stated as a matter of 'warranty' to the user or consumer,"
but that strict liability in tort "is not subject to the various contract rules which have grown up to
surround . . . sales." This thought is developed in the leading case of Greenman v. Yuba Power
Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 67, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963), and a series of New Jersey
cases. Rosenau v. City of New Brunswick, 51 N.J. 130, 238 A.2d 169 (1968); Santor v. A & M
Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32
N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960). The Rosenau case underscores the haziness of any hypothetical line
between warranty and tort by holding that a breach of warranty action is subject to the tort, rather
than contract, statute of limitations.
11. Pulley v. Pacific Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 68 Wash. 2d 778, 415 P.2d 636 (1966); cf. cases
cited note 7 supra.
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II.

WHEN

SHOULD

EVIDENCE

OF

DEFENDANT'S

DUE

CARE

BE

ADMISSIBLE?

Pulley v. Pacific Coca-Cola Bottling Co.'2 sets out the major argu-

ments against the admission of defendant's evidence that due care was
exercised in the production of the product. Plaintiff brought an action
based on breach of implied warranty, alleging that she became violently
ill after discovering a cigarette in a partially consumed bottle of CocaCola. The Washington Supreme Court held that defendant's offer of
testimony relating to its processing and bottling methods had been properly excluded. The court stated that the mere assertion by a consumerplaintiff of harm from a foreign object in food or drink is sufficient to
render inadmissible any showing "by indirect and circumstantial evidence that it was improbable or even impossible that the defendants
were responsible for the presence of the harmful object."' 3 According
to the court, plaintiff's assertion had the practical effect of shifting the
burden to defendant manufacturer and defendant retailer to show the
way in which the contamination occurred. 4 Evidence of due care was
held to be incompetent for this purpose under reasoning that runs as
follows: the function of due care testimony would be to impeach the
plaintiff's testimony that the defect existed; one "cannot impeach the
credibility of an opposing party's testimony by testimony collateral to
the issues of the case;"' 5 and due care evidence is collateral because it
is indirect and circumstantial-"not directly refutative of the plaintiff's
relation of the incident involved."'16
So stated, it is apparent that the reasoning is questionable. First,
testimony by a plaintiff on the existence of a defect cannot shift the
ultimate burden of persuasion, but at most can shift only the burden of
producing evidence.' 7 Further, whether evidence is collateral is determined by its relation to the issues of the case, and not by its characterization as direct or circumstantial. 8 Finally, the opinion offers no reason
12. 68 Wash. 2d 778, 415 P.2d 636 (1966).
13. Id. at 783, 415 P.2d at 640.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 784, 415 P.2d at 640.
16. Id.
17. See C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE 639 (1954).
18. McCormick describes noncollateral facts as those "which would have been independently
provable" and divides them into 2 categories: (1)those that are relevant to the substantive issues
in the case; and (2) those such as bias, interest, and want of capacity that, regardless of the
substantive issues, would be independently provable by extrinsic evidence to impeach or disqualify
the witness. Id. at 101-02. In any event, whether due care evidence is characterized as "collateral"
would not affect its admissibility. The significance of labeling relevant evidence "collateral" is that
it precludes impeachment of that evidence by other, extrinsic evidence. Id. Thus, if Pulley is correct
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for excluding evidence, whatever its function, simply because it is circumstantial.
The Pulley case nevertheless is interesting because it suggests an
argument against admissibility that is worthy of detailed analysis. The

court noted that "despite the investment of large sums of money, manpower, and scientific expertise, the manufacturers of this carbonated
beverage apparently have as yet been unable to develop a bottling or

manufacturing process which is infallible in terms of the purity and
wholesomeness of the manufactured product."'" This observation is
equally applicable to the manufacturers of other products. One hundred
percent quality control probably does not exist,20 and anything too

closely approaching it might-well price out of the market the product
to which it is applied. 2' A prime function of industrial engineers is to
determine the desired level of the so-called "consumer's risk,' '22 or "al-

lowable percent defective,"23 by balancing the costs of quality control
against the number of defective products the market will bear. The
result is the percentage of inevitable defects that will occur under any
given degree of sampling or other quality control technique. 24 By any
name, this mathematical percentage describes the obvious fact that a
prudent, careful manufacturer deliberately assigns to each consumer a
specific known risk that the product he buys will be defective. One

authority has stated that most quality control planners will accept a
level of risk of five to ten percent-that is, a risk that the control plan
when it describes due care evidence as collateral because its function is to impeach the plaintiff's
evidence of defectiveness, this action simply raises the wholly separate question whether plaintiff
would be entitled to attack the credibility of the due care evidence. Since, presumably, due care
evidence would be presented by defendant on direct rather than cross examination, many courts
would permit the attack even after the due care evidence is classified "collateral." Id. at 101; see
cases cited note 6 supra and accompanying text.
19. 68 Wash. 2d at 779, 415 P. 2d at 637 (emphasis in original).
20. The purpose of quality control has been described as designing the manufacturing process so that "the proportion of unsatisfactory or defective units is not excessive." D. COWDEN,
STATISTICAL METHODS IN QUALITY CONTROL 1 (1957) (emphasis added).
21. One authority has estimated that "if a perfect product is to be guaranteed, it will usually
be necessary to do at least 200 per cent inspection unless some completely mechanical inspection
device can be used." N. ENRICK, QUALITY CONTROL 1 (4th ed. 1962). The same author also
observes: "Under the speed of mass production, it is often impossible to continually turn out 100
per cent satisfactory products. One must assume a certain percentage of defectives will always
occur on certain processes; however, if the percentage does not exceed a certain limit, it is often
more economical to allow the defectives to go through rather than to screen each lot." Id. at 7.
22. See Cowan, Some Policy Bases of Products Liability, 17 STAN. L. REV. 1077, 1090-93
(1965).
23. D. COWDEN, supra note 20, at 5, 101, 489; N. ENRICK, supra note 21, at 6.
24. Cowan, supra note 22, at 1091.
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will fail to detect five or ten percent of the processing defects.25 In other
words, a prudent manufacturer or processer will not seek a lower risk
because of the inordinate increase in cost. While the careful manufacturer will produce fewer defective items than his careless counterpart,
he inevitably will produce some that are defective. It is on the basis of
the inherent fallibility of quality control plans that the strongest argument can be made in support of the Pulley-Prosser conclusion that the
producer's evidence of due care is irrelevant.
Preliminarily, it is helpful to clarify the meaning of "relevance."
Generally, relevant evidence is that which tends to establish the infer2
How strong must this tendency be? One
ence for which it is offeredY.
largely discredited view is that the evidence must render the inference
more likely than any competing inferences.2 That this standard is too
harsh is readily apparent. Most competent evidence is simply cumulative; while in itself it could not justify a jury in drawing the desired
inference, it will permit the inference when considered in conjunction
with all the other evidence tending to support the same inference. If a
victim were killed by a man wearing a red shirt, then evidence that the
defendant owned a red shirt at the time of the event probably would be
admissible, but this evidence, without more, clearly would not justify a
finding that the defendant was the culprit. The better view, then, is that
evidence is relevant if it renders the inference more likely than it would
28
be without the evidence.
Assume a simple products liability case in which the plaintiff
bought the item from the defendant; the principal evidence that the
product was defective comes from the testimony of the plaintiff; and the
only rebuttal available to defendant is that due care was used in the
manufacture and processing of the item. Perhaps the defendant can
show that his quality control efficiency is .999-of every 1,000 items
marketed, only one is likely to be defective. Standing alone, this evidence would not seem to be sufficient to support a finding that any one
particular defect, such as the one in questi6n, was not created by the
25. C. SMITH, QUALITY AND RELIABILITY: AN INTEGRATED APPROACH 94 (1969). D. CowDEN, supra note 20, at 489, notes that consumer's risk is "often" given a value of 10%.
26. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 17, at 317.
27. See Engel v. United Traction Co., 203 N.Y. 321, 323, 96 N.E. 731, 732 (1911); cf. State
ex rel. District Attorney v. Ingram, 179 Miss. 485, 491, 176 So. 392, 394 (1937) (circumstantial

evidence is admissible in civil cases when consistent with the theory sought to be established, and
inconsistent with any other theory, and when it amounts to a high degree of probability); People
v. Nitzberg, 287 N.Y. 183, 187, 38 N.E. 2d 490, 493 (1941) (holding that a fact is relevant to
another fact when the existence of the one renders the existence of the other highly probable).
28. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hillmon, 145 U.S. 285 (1892); Riss & Co. v. Galloway, 108 Colo.
93, 97, 114 P.2d 550,552 (1941); Ames v. MacPhail, 289 Mich. 185, 192, 286 N.W. 206, 208 (1939).
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manufacturing process. To the contrary, given that the item was defective, and absent any other explanation of the way in which the defect
was created, the evidence might well compel a finding that the item
simply was one of the inevitable production line deviations. The seller's
position is not unlike that of a defendant who, to rebut prosecution
testimony that defendant was the murderer and that he was wearing a
red shirt at the time of the crime offers to show that only one of his 50
shirts was red, and that he was therefore unlikely to have been wearing
a red shirt on the day of the crime. The significant aspect of the evidence
is that the defendant did own a red shirt, not that he owned shirts of 49
other hues. Similarly, in the products liability case it can be argued that
it is more important that the manufacturer does in fact produce some
defective items than that he produces a larger number of good ones.
The preceding analysis leads to the quite proper conclusion that
evidence of due care alone does not tend to prove affirmatively that the
defendant sold a nondefective product, but this does not necessarily
mean that the due care evidence is irrelevant. The analysis is incomplete
because it assumes that the evidence of defectiveness is credible. Of
course, evidence tending to prove that the product is defective will be
offered in every case, even if it consists solely of plaintiff's testimony;
but if the invalidity of plaintiff's evidence is a permissible inference, then
it is made more likely by evidence that the manufacturer utilized effective quality control methods. The inference that the plaintiff is lying or
mistaken as to what he found in his Coca-Cola bottle, for example, is
strengthened by evidence that the bottler employs production techniques
that reduce to a practical minimum the probability that foreign objects
will find their way into bottles.
This reasoning would lead to a tentative conclusion that evidence
of due care is competent for the purpose of attacking the credibility or
probative force of plaintiffs evidence, even though it would not alone
permit an inference that the item was not defective when sold by the
defendant. The distinction is hardly a powerful one. Since no amount
of care will eliminate the production of some defective items, evidence
that the defendant was careful is at best of weak probative
value-regardless of the purpose for which it is admitted-when the
issue is whether one particular item was or was not one of the inevitable
processing aberrations. In actual practice, however, it seems that courts
are in fact more willing to admit due care evidence when they are
doubtful of plaintiffs credibility. 21 In at least one instance, admissibility
29. See Simon v. Graham Bakery, 17 N.J. 525, 111 A.2d 884 (1955); Barefield v. LaSalle
Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 370 Mich. 1, 120 N.W.2d 786 (1963). In Simon, plaintiff testified that
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was expressly defended because it was defendant's only means of defending against and of casting doubt on plaintiff's testimony." Even
Pulley acknowledged the persuasiveness of the contention that the defendants' "only possible course of action-and defense-is to impeach
the credibility of the plaintiff's story by demonstrating the improbability of a foreign object escaping the assorted methods and techniques
utilized to insure the wholesomeness of the finished product."' 3'
We have examined the situation in which the product was purchased directly from the defendant, and the defect, if any, necessarily
existed at the time of the sale. There remain for discussion those cases
in which (1)plaintiff does not buy the product from defendant but from
a retailer who buys it directly or indirectly from defendant, or (2) plaintiff purchases directly from defendant, but the defect, if any, may have
been created after the sale. In either event, the defendant can avoid
liability, as explained by the drafters of the UCC, via "an affirmative
showing. . . that the loss resulted from some action or event following
his own delivery of the goods .... ,,32
In Code terms, the defendant33
under these circumstances would not have breached any warranty;
in the language of strict tort liability, the item could not be said to have
34
been unreasonably dangerous when sold by the defendant.
In these kinds of cases, the function of the jury is to weigh the
probability of three possible inferences:(1) the item was defective when
sold by defendant, (2) the item became defective after the sale by defendant, and (3) the item was not defective at any relevant time. A verdict
for plaintiff will occur if the jury believes that the probability of inference (1)is greater than the combined probabilities of inferences (2) and
(3). This idea can be expressed simply in formula terms: when PI is the
probability of inference (1), P2 of inference (2), and P3 of inference (3),
she cut her mouth on glass contained in a loaf of bread that she had purchased 4 days earlier from
defendant bakery. It was held error for the trial court to have excluded testimony of care used by
the bakery, because the purpose of the testimony was "to refute the inference that the jury might
otherwise draw that the piece of glass was in the bread when it was purchased." 17 N.J. at 529,
Ill A.2d at 886. The Barefieldcase approved evidence of the defendant's processing methods and
techniques for excluding impurities from its bottles, "for the purpose of negating the probability
that the glass particles entered the bottle of Coca-Cola at defendant's plant.
...
370 Mich. at
6,120 N.W. 2d at 789. In each instance the evidence would appear to be helpful only for the
purpose of evaluating plaintiff's credibility.
30. Conklin v. Ossining Food Center, Inc., 48 N.Y.S.2d 716 (Westchester County Ct. 1944).
31. 68 Wash. 2d at 783, 415 P.2d at 639.
32. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-314, Comment 13.
33. Id. § 2-314.
34. RESTATEMENT (SECoND) OF TORTS § 402A (1964).
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the plaintiff wins if the jury finds that P 1> P2 + P3, and the defendant
35
wins if P1 : P2 + P3.
P I, the probability that the item was defective when sold by the
defendant, is influenced largely by the consumer's risk36 or allowable
percent defective "7 established by the quality control techniques of the
defendant and any earlier processor or handler in the chain of
distribution. Thus, evidence of due care is directly relevant to the jury's
estimate of the probative value of P1.
P2, the probability that the item was made defective after the sale
by defendant, will vary depending upon the nature of the product, the
distribution methods employed, and a potentially infinite variety of
circumstances and events relevant to the period between sale by defendant and injury to plaintiff. If defendant is a soft drink bottler, P2 is
the probability that the bottle was tampered with and a foreign object
inserted into the bottle during that period between sale by defendant and
injury to plaintiff. If defendant is the manufacturer of an automobile
with allegedly defective brakes, P2 will depend upon such matters as
whether any part of the braking system had been worked on by other
parties after delivery by the defendant, whether the automobile was
subjected to misuse by the buyer or any other drivers, and whether the
defect was of a type ordinarily associated with mishandling on the one
hand or production line negligence on the other.
P3, the probability that the product was not in fact defective,
usually will depend upon the credibility of plaintiff and his othei witnesses, including experts. In the soft drink case, the crucial testimony
generally will be that of plaintiff who allegedly discovered the foreign
objects;3 8 a disintegrated grinding wheel case can turn on the credibility
of an expert witness who explains why, in his opinion, the wheel was
damaged during manufacture. 39 In other cases, P3 may hinge on the
inferences a jury chooses to draw from undisputed facts, for example,
occurrence of the accident a short time after sale, or the improbability
35. Mathematicians familiar with the laws of probability inform the author that a more
precise mathematical statement is that plaintiff wins if P1 P2 +_.3_ . Since the correct formula
l-P3
is somewhat cumbersome, and does not affect the analysis or conclusions concerning relevance of
the evidence of due care, the simplified formula will continue to be used in the text.
36. See note 22 supra and accompanying text.
37. See note 23 supra and accompanying text.
38. See, e.g., Sharp v. Pittsburg Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 180 Kan. 845, 308 P.2d 150 (1957);
Barefield v. LaSalle Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 370 Mich. 1, 120 N.W.2d 786 (1963).
39. See Kuzma v. United States Rubber Co., 323 F.2d 657 (3d Cir. 1963). For other cases
in which expert testimony was used to establish plaintiff's case see Vandermark v. Ford Motor
Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1964) (defective brakes); Smith v. HencirNichols, Inc., 276 Minn. 390, 150 N.W. 2d 556 (1967) (defective steering gear).
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of alternative explanations."
Sometimes both P2 and P3 will be variables, because a jury could
assign varying degrees of weight to the evidence both that a defect in
fact did exist and that it came into being before rather than after sale
by defendant. In the landmark case of Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.," for example, the issue was whether the accident was caused
by a steering system that was defective at the time the car was bought
from the defendant dealer. In finding for plaintiff, the jury first had to
believe evidence tending to establish that the steering system was
defective (expert testimony plus plaintiff's testimony that she heard a
crack and that the wheel spun in her hands) and, secondly, had to infer
from the circumstances that the car had not become defective after the
sale (it had 468 miles on the speedometer and had been bought just ten
days before the accident).
Clearly, if there is reason for disputing the weight to be assigned
either P2, P3, or both, evidence bearing on the value of P1 ordinarily
should be competent because it can aid the jury in determining whether
PI is greater than the sum of P2 and P3. In other words, when the
defectiveness of the product is a jury question, or when the dispute
revolves around the point in time at which the product became defective,
evidence of due care exercised by the defendant or some earlier processor or handler will be relevant. If the evidence will not permit conflicting
inferences on either P2 or P3, by definition the question is moot because
a directed verdict is in order.
Contaminated food cases often may present situations in which
conflicting inferences are not permissible. Suppose the plaintiff testifies
he bit into the remains of a dead mouse buried in a can of sardines, and
five disinterested witnesses corroborate his story in clear and convincing
testimony. The defendant cannery hardly could contend that the mouse
somehow got into the can after it left the processing plant. Since no
reasonable juror could find other than that the mouse was in the can
when it was sold by the defendant, it is not relevant how careful a canner
the defendant might be. In formula terms, P2 and P3 for all practical
purposes are equal to zero (that is, they are not variables) and the value
of P1, therefore, is not in issue. Since no jury question remains, a verdict
for plaintiff is compelled.
40. See, e.g., Vaccarezza v. Sanguinetti, 71 Cal. App. 2d 687, 163 P.2d 470 (1945) (plaintiff
need not preclude all other possible inferences as long as he establishes reasonableness of his
inference by a preponderance of the evidence); Patterson v. George H. Weyer, Inc., 189 Kan. 501,
370 P.2d 116 (1962); Jacobson v. Broadway Motors, Inc., 430 S.W.2d 602 (Mo. Ct. App. 1968)
(fire in automobile engine driven 1,100 miles after sale).
41. 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
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The contaminated soft drink cases may present somewhat different
considerations. If the hypothetical mouse were undeniably present in a

Coca-Cola bottle, then a defendant bottler might contend that the
mouse was there because someone tampered with the container after it

left the plant.42 In support, defendant might offer evidence of the care

employed in the bottling process. While the probability of subsequent
tampering in this case is not zero, in the absence of some affirmative
evidence common sense dictates that the likelihood of tampering is less
than the probability that the mouse entered the bottle before the cap was

first sealed, regardless of the degree of care used in the bottling process.4 3 Although P2 is a variable, because jurors reasonably could differ

in their estimates of the likelihood of interim tampering, there is no
evidence to support an inference that its maximum value reasonably
could exceed that of P1. 44 Thus, in the absence of affirmative evidence
of subsequent tampering, evidence of due care probably should be ex-

it could afford no rational basis for a finding that
cluded because alone
45
P1 is less than P2.

42. See, e.g., Crystal Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Cathey, 83 Ariz. 163, 317 P.2d 1094 (1957);
App. 2d 406, 183 N.E.2d 56 (1962); Heimsoth v. Falstaff
Harris v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 35 Ill.
Brewing Corp., 1 111. App. 2d 38, 116 N.E.2d 193 (1953); Strawn v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 234
S.W.2d 223 (Mo. Ct. App. 1950).
seems to us more probable that in spite of the defendant's precautions the body of
43. "[I]t
the mouse in some way escaped detection by the defendant's employees and was in the bottle when
it was filled with the beverage at the defendant's plant than that it was inserted in the bottle by
some malicious person while it was stored in Ruiz' shed." Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Torres, 255
F.2d 149, 153 (1st Cir. 1958) (holding that plaintiff need not prove absence of tampering, despite
evidence of opportunity to tamper).
44. See id.; Crystal Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Cathey, 83 Ariz, 163, 317 P.2d 1094 (1957).
45. Some warranty cases require plaintiff to prove a lack of reasonable opportunity for
tampering by third persons or, if such an opportunity existed, that there actually was no tampering.
E.g., Sharpe v. Danville Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 9 Ill. App. 2d 17, 132 N.E.2d 442 (1956);
Williams v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 285 S.W.2d 53 (Mo. Ct. App. 1955). The better view recognizes the inherent unlikelihood of tampering. Simmons v. Wichita Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 181
Kan. 35, 390 P.2d 633 (1957); Le Blanc v. Louisiana Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 221 La. 919, 60 So.
2d 873 (1952); Ada Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Ashbury, 206 Okla. 269, 242 P.2d 497 (1952);
Wichita Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Tyler, 288 S.W.2d 903 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956). Nevertheless,
courts generally perceive tampering as a jury issue, even in the total absence of any affirmative
evidence. It is submitted that this is wrong, and that in view of the inherent unlikelihood of
tampering, a rebuttable presumption against tampering would better comport with reality. Consider, for example, the inherent inconsistency of the reasoning of Crystal Coca-Cola Bottling Co.
v. Cathey, 83 Ariz. 163, 317 P.2d 1094 (1957). The court approved an instruction by the trial court,
asking the jury to determine whether the fly got into the bottle as a result of tampering, and
concluded that "the jury might reasonably have decided that under the circumstances there was
no tampering with the bottle after it left the bottler's control." Id. at 1099. This observation is
followed, without apology, by a statement which necessarily implied that the issue of tampering
should not have been submitted to the jury at all: "To decide that there was a tampering would
require the jury to believe in this case that a person would go unobserved to the cooler behind the
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One other variant suggests itself-when the only issue is whether
the defect was created before or after the product left defendant's possession, and there is no affirmative evidence or common-sense assumption to aid the jury in its finding. Suppose it is undisputed that the
accident was caused by defective brakes, that it occurred when the car
had been driven only 300 miles, and that there was no evidence that the
car had been serviced or otherwise tampered with. Presumably, the jury
could infer that the product was defective at the time of sale. Should
the manufacturer and dealer be permitted to introduce testimony of
their due care in normal production, inspection, and make-ready techniques? In formula terms, P3, the probability that no defect existed, by
hypothesis is zero and thus drops out of the formula; P2, the probability
that the defect came into existence after the sale, is a variable, and jurors
can give it more or less weight as they see fit. P2, however, is a variable
only because absolutely nothing is known about it, not because it is the
subject of conflicting evidence or of one-sided evidence that may or may
not be given credence. If there is no evidence with respect to what
happened after the sale, is it relevant to show that due care was exercised
before the sale? If there is no affirmative evidence regarding P2, is
affirmative evidence of P1 relevant?
While the question is not free from doubt, it seems that the evidence
should be admitted. The defect could have been created because the car
hit a chuck-hole, it was tampered with by vandals, or the braking system
was dismantled and improperly reassembled by plaintiff, although he
has declined to so testify. While the jury would not be allowed to conclude that one of these post-sale events was the specific cause of the
defect, the jury could conclude that the mere existence of these speculative possibilities makes it more likely than not that the defect did not
exist prior to sale. It seems to follow that this inference would be more
likely in the case of a careful manufacturer than in that of a careless
one, and that evidence of due care therefore would be relevant.
III.

CONCLUSION

Evidence of due care is technically relevant whenever the evidence
permits conflicting inferences on the following issues: (1) whether a
defect existed, or (2) whether, if it did, it was created prior to the time
counter in a drugstore or the druggist or one of his employees would go to the cooler and place
therein a bottle of coca-cola in which he had put a fly by removing and replacing the cap and this
without being able to foretell who might be served that bottle or when it might be served. This, we
submit, is too far-fetched for reasonable men to consider seriously." Id. By definition, inferences
that are too far-fetched for reasonable men to consider seriously should not be submitted to juries

in the first instance.
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of sale by defendant. If neither of these issues is in dispute, or if the

evidence compels but one finding with respect to each issue, the question
ordinarily will be moot since the case will be subject to a directed
verdict; but when either of these two questions are disputed, there is
little doubt that as to mere relevance, the position of the drafters of the
comment to the Uniform Commercial Code" is superior to that of the
Pulley case. 7 Admittedly, the probative force of the evidence is not
great.48 In the individual case, therefore, its relevance might be outweighed by counterbalancing factors such as undue potential for prejudice or distraction from the main issue; if so, the evidence always can
properly be excluded within the sound discretion of the trial court. 9
46. See note 9 supra and accompanying text.
47. 68 Wash. 2d 778, 415 P.2d 636 (1966).
48. See note 29 supra and accompanying text.
49. Thompson v. American Steel & Wire Co., 317 Pa. 7, 11, 175 A. 541, 544 (1934)

